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I. A BACKGROUND NOTE  
More than at any other point in time, the approach of the third millennium of modern Western 
history1 heralds both significantly new and even radically different challenges and opportunities for 
the overall human rights situation on the African continent. On the one hand, a new African 
"renaissance" has been proclaimed in which the peoples of the continent are being called upon to 
assume their rightful place in the community of nations and to put the turmoil and tragedy of their 
past behind.2 On the other, internal and regional conflicts-even in countries that until recently 
appeared relatively stable and sanguine such as Namibia and Senegal-appear to grow not simply 
in frequency and magnitude, but also in intensity, viciousness and complexity.  
International wars such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia do not bode well for the better observation of and respect for the wide corpus of human 
rights. Explanations for the ferocity and morbid depths of the civil conflagration that engulfed Sierra 
Leone will preoccupy psychologists of armed conflict for decades to come.3 Despite the opening of some democratic space in countries as diverse as Algeria and Nigeria, the problems have not gone 
away; they've simply assumed different forms of expression. In a nutshell, the human rights 
situation on the African continent today is most certainly in a state of considerable flux.  
At the same time, Africa remains a continent marginalized from the tremendous technological, 
economic and developmental achievements that the world has made over the last few decades. 
Rigorous measures of economic and social reform and adjustment have produced conditions that 
are only marginally improved over what they were before the "shock therapy" measures were 
applied, and even then, only for some countries on the continent.4 The countries that have 
dominated the lower quartile of the UNDP's Human Development Index for all ten years that the 
Human Development Report has been produced are from Africa.5 It goes without saying that 
Africa's human development situation is in dire need of attention.6  
However, when discussing the issue of human rights from a continental perspective, it is important 
not to forget that the internal dynamics of individual country-situations in various parts of the 
continent are crucial to an understanding of the overall human rights context. Each of Africa's over 
fifty countries has distinct political economies and historical backgrounds that need to be taken into 
account in any analysis that seeks to draw broad conclusions of general conceptual veracity. Thus, 
countries that enjoy stable political systems will differ from those facing irredentist and 
secessionary movements. States undergoing political transition will manifest distinct problems from 
those engaged in internal armed conflict.7 States struggling against collapsed social and political 
systems are faced by unique issues, including-for some like Somalia-the very question of their 
raison d'être and viability as states.8 The myriad social, religious, cultural, political and even 
idiosyncratic distinctions between the countries of the continent all need to be taken into account. 
Thus, making broad prognostications and drawing sweeping conclusions for a continent as diverse 
and complex as Africa may be an exercise in futility.  
There is little doubt that external regional and international forces will impact on domestic country 
contexts in numerous ways. Thus, external conditions driven by the forces of the contemporary 
global political economy, and compounded by cultural factors will also be of significance in 
assessing the overall human rights situation. The influence of global arms-dealers will be as 
significant as that of the international broadcast media and of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Alexandr Kalashnikov's AK-47 assault rifle will vie for domination alongside Ted Turner's CNN and 
cultural/corporate phenomena like Madonna and Nike.9 Major questions of accountability and 
social responsibility are raised by the dominance of the economic scene that such actors are able 
to exercise.10 What is also apparent from the preceding is that no external phenomenon is likely to 
have as telling an impact on the overall human rights condition in the African continent, than the 
phenomenon of globalization.11 Although traditionally conceived as an economic phenomenon, 
globalization has significant implications for the social, political and cultural evolution of humankind 
in Africa in the coming century.12 Moreover, the human rights implications of the phenomenon are 
only just beginning to be critically engaged and comprehensively understood.13 As United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan has pointed out: "Globalization has an immense potential to improve 
people's lives, but it can disrupt-and destroy-them as well. Those who do not accept its pervasive, 
all-encompassing ways are often left behind."14  In analyzing the human rights context from either the broad continental level or from a more narrow 
country-specific perspective, concern must invariably be focused on the situation of the individual, 
and upon the manner in which the protection of his or her individual human rights is enhanced or 
not. This is the essential remit of the human rights text that is just over 50 years of age: protecting 
the individual against unwarranted and unjustified state interference to body and mind. Needless to 
say, the contemporary African situation presents wholly new and different contexts within which the 
realization of such rights extend beyond individual concern, and must be extended to encompass 
the family and the community. It is also crucially important not to forget the fact that traditional 
conceptions of human rights in the African context subsume the interests of the individual to those 
of the community at large, and in this way, also raise the correlation between human rights and 
human duties or obligations.15 In my opinion, critical to an understanding of the extent to which the 
protection and promotion of such rights will actually be enhanced is the degree to which the 
realization of two essentially group rights will be guaranteed. Those group rights are the right to 
peace and security (or freedom from conflict)16 and the right to sustainable human development 
(or freedom from want, deprivation and marginalization).17 These rights are considered critical 
because they provide an holistic context in which the more traditional individual human rights can 
be given most articulate and wholesome expression. It is meaningless to focus on the right to free 
expression and association in a situation rife with marauding armed combatants as in the case of 
Sierra Leone, Burundi or Liberia. The point made by Kofi Annan in his report to the 52nd Session 
of the General Assembly graphically illustrates this conundrum:  
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-State in 
origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting 
for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, 
returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined 
Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.18 
It is just as futile to speak of the right of participation in conditions when basic human necessities 
such as food, shelter and water are beyond the reach of the majority of the population. What is the 
meaning of the 'right to vote' when the voter may be too weak from disease and hunger to 
effectively exercise his or her franchise? Conversely, unless freedom of expression is guaranteed, 
the hungry voter is unable to articulate the cause of his or her malnourishment and deprivation. 
The short point is that for a human being to be considered whole, they must be able to enjoy both 
civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, such enjoyment 
must be exercised in generalized contexts that ensure that daily physical existence is not under 
threat of predictable extermination on account of hunger, disease or conflict. Conceived in this 
fashion, human rights then become the bedrock of a wholesome and integrated approach to 
sustainable human development. An inordinate focus on one category at the expense of another 
will obviously produce a truncated human reality.19  
The main focus of this study is the regional protection of human rights on the African continent. It 
provides a short historical backdrop before moving on to an examination of the normative 
framework that presently prevails at the continental level. Engaged in this section are issues such 
as cultural relativism or reductionism,20 the structure and content of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights,21 the human rights of women, and the phenomenon of forced displacement-
represented most graphically by the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 
the pen-ultimate section of the paper, I examine the existing institutional mechanisms that have 
been established to enforce human rights on the continent. The particular focus is on the Commission established under the Charter, as well as on the African Court on Human & Peoples' 
Rights-the protocol for which has only recently been promulgated.22 Consideration is also paid to 
the national level of human rights enforcement-the level at which human rights must ultimately find 
concrete expression-and the role of civil society therein. The last section of the paper examines the 
challenges for sustainable human development that lie ahead and the opportunities available for 
the enhancement of the human rights situation on the African continent.  
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: AN HISTORICAL RESUME  
2.1 Comprehending the effects of the Colonial Legacy  
Any analysis of the contemporary situation of human rights on the African continent must approach 
the issue against the backdrop of a fairly broad sociohistorical perspective. Such a perspective is 
essential not simply because of the transmutation of various forms of social organization and 
expression as a result of both indigenous and external forces, but because history continues to 
exert its influence even up to the present point in time. Pre-colonial historical forms can be seen as 
much in the resilience of cultural (so-called "traditional") norms that govern domestic relations and 
the family in the same way that colonial forces are apparent in contemporary political systems and 
economic relations. Nearly half a century after most countries on the continent attained 
independence, so many of them continue to utilize colonial laws governing political association, 
public health, education and free expression. The consequence is that their very claim to having 
made a difference in the human rights reality of the people they govern is effectively negated. Laws 
continue to exist on African statute books outlawing the defamation of a foreign "potentate," the 
barracking of persons with contagious disease, the establishment of civic associations, and a host 
of penal sanctions that stem from the Victorian era, and which clearly violate contemporary notions 
of human rights.23  
We need not restate the fact that the colonial epoch in Africa represented the negation of all 
categories of human rights from the basic right of self-determination to the freedoms of expression 
and association. Despite the altruistic, moralistic and religious veneer in which the phenomenon 
was clothed, colonialism was primarily concerned with how much could be extracted from the 
territories and peoples it brought under its control.24 Based on a system of extra-economic 
coercion, colonialism had little time for the recognition and protection of rights that would threaten 
or undermine its primary economic objective. This explains why resources expended on coercion 
(the police, gendarmarie, the armed forces and on prison services) were far in excess of those 
devoted to any social service in any colony on the continent. It also explains the apartheid-like 
differentials based primarily on race but reinforced by class which resulted in highly stratified social 
formations, and critically impacted on the ethnic frameworks of the colonized territories.25 In the 
words of Jalali and Lipset, "Over time such (colonial) policies created widespread economic and 
social disparities between ethnic groups. Certain ethnic groups were selected as collaborators or 
channels for the transmission of government patronage."26 Many such disparities have persisted 
into the post-colonial era, resurfacing to wreak havoc with a vengeance.  
2.2 Human Rights Within the Organization of African Unity (OAU)  
Ironically, in the field of human rights independent African states have on the whole performed little 
better than their colonial predecessors. The first attempt at a continental approach to Africa's 
myriad problems was pursued under the rubric of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963.27 The Charter of this negated expression of pan-Africanism clearly delineated 
the twin focus of the organization as the right to self-determination and the protection of the 
incipient and fragile foundations of states that had only just regained their independence.28 
Preoccupied with these two major concerns, it is of little surprise that the Charter contained only 
scant reference to human rights and focused inordinately on state sovereignty and its 
accompanying concordat of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.29 Although 
noble objectives at the time-given the continued existence of several colonies compounded by 
apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia and the debacle of UN intervention in the Congo-the net 
effect may, in the words of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, "actually have damaged 
the cause of human rights."30 The OAU Charter-the quintessential instrument governing the 
conduct of relations between African states-ignored the fact that states were merely a 
conglomeration of people to whom human rights protection should have been logically extended. 
The reference in the Charter to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made in 
reinforcement of the opposition of the body to the policies of colonialism and apartheid. However, 
scant attention was paid to broad or specific human rights principles as such.31  
Unfortunately, the damage done to the concept of human rights in the early years of independence 
meant that it remained on the back burner of political debate and activity through two bitter 
decades of African history. As a consequence, single party states and military dictatorships 
assumed the dominant forms of governance on the continent. Characterized in the extreme by 
leaders such as Uganda's Idi Amin and the Central African Republic's Jean Bedel Bokassa, it was 
also a period in which the Cold War stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union 
allowed for the almost unfettered assault on the human rights of the African peoples. Essential 
aspects of the right to development-health, education and just conditions of work-were also 
relegated to oblivion. It was against this background that in 1981 the OAU promulgated the African 
Charter which has evolved to become the principal continental human rights instrument on the 
continent.32 Tokunbo Ige has pointed out that there was a sense or urgency that attended the 
drafting and adoption of the Charter. The result was a number of compromises and weaknesses 
being written into the instrument.33 Others have dismissed the African Charter outright. It is to a 
consideration of the substance of the Charter that we now turn to examine the concrete dimensions 
of its practical operation on the continent.  
III. THE NORMATIVE AFRICAN FRAMEWORK: RADICAL DEPARTURE OR 'BUSINESS AS 
USUAL?'  
3.1 Revisiting the Debate about African Cultural "relativism"  
Most debates about the human rights framework on the African continent begin from an analysis of 
the relationship between the international instruments that have evolved over time -the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants in particular-and the regional body of 
normative standards.34 Implicated immediately in this debate is a tension that has come to be 
characterized as the phenomenon of "Cultural Relativism."35 This is the argument about the extent 
to which ostensibly universal standards of human rights observance should be tempered and 
conditioned by the local cultural situation that prevails in the distinct regions of the world.36 That 
tension is apparent in both the text and in the formulation of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights.37 The African Charter marks itself out as a distinctive human rights instrument 
even as it simultaneously draws inspiration from the Universal Declaration and other international 
human rights instruments.38 This is evident from the preamble of the instrument to the emphasis on the family, the community and the state, as well as on the issue of duties.39 In this way, the 
instrument does indeed mark some conceptual distance from its international precursors.40 The 
Charter is definitely an instrument that is married to the sociocultural context in which it was given 
birth.41  
This fact is also reflected in its adoption of the term "peoples"42 to complement "human" and 
through the constant references back to the phenomenon of "African civilization." Thus, the fifth 
preambular paragraph of the Charter stipulates as follows:  
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization 
which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights." 
Although the question of culture is certainly an important and relevant one in the discussion about 
human rights today, unfortunately much of the debate on the subject is-as Yash Ghai has pointed 
out-unproductive.43 This is because on the one hand it pits those (the "Universalists") who assert 
that the Universal Declaration and the corpus of norms that have evolved around it constitute a 
truly universal ethos over which there can be no debate.44 At the other end of the spectrum are the 
"relativists" who assert that there can be no universalities. Consequently, all human rights 
standards must be subjected to the local conditions specific to the country, the culture or the 
religion in question. The relativists erect culture as a barrier to criticism or challenge to practices 
that clearly violate fundamental human rights. Conversely, the Universalists have transformed 
human rights discourse into an intellectual battering ram, chanting the mantra of universalism even 
when deference to the local will produce a solution that is not only more enduring, but one that 
enhances the protection of human rights in that community. Not only is such an approach 
insensitive to the reality of genuine cultural nuances that exist on the ground, but it negates one of 
the most fundamental tenets on which a truly universalist human rights ethos is grounded: inclusion 
and dialogue.  
In most instances relativists are southern politicians whose human rights practices are at a 
minimum questionable, and often extremely violative on a host of fronts. Regarding the situation of 
women in particular, relativists seek to retain the dominance of patriarchal structures of social 
ordering and to resist what would amount to a diminution of traditionally-exercised power and 
control within the family and its attendant implications at the community and the state level.45  
Between the two there is no middle ground. In scholarly debate, the relativist argument is the one 
most often easily dismissed. Unfortunately, the Universalists often premise their debunking of 
cultural relativism and reaffirmation of the universalist ideal on an ahistorical-and near-missionary-
conception of the development and contemporary application of human rights.46 In the first 
instance, it is impossible to run away from the fact that the human rights instruments as we know 
them are culturally, politically and historically rooted in forms of state/individual structuring that 
have their roots in Western liberal democracy. Very few of the states that make up the international 
community today were at the table where the Universal Declaration was debated.47 Moreover, 
many of the most important promulgators of the instrument including both Britain and France were 
colonial powers, which partly explains why the Declaration fails to mention the right to self 
determination-a fundamental democratic right of all peoples.48  The United States was yet to recognize the equality of people of colour, while the Soviet Union had 
violently suppressed the rights of numerous peoples forcibly incorporated within its ambit. The 
same country also housed several thousand in virtual concentration camps. It was quite ironic that 
these four countries were the most prominent in the promulgation of an instrument the basic 
principles of which they domestically recognized much more in their breach. Current universalist 
rhetoric notwithstanding, it is quite evident that the UDHR assumed the shape and character most 
familiar to Judeo-Christian conceptions of democratic governance and individual autonomy.49 To 
compound the problem, the vision of human rights that most universalists accept and pursue with 
single-minded devotion, is one that has consistently failed to recognize either economic, social and 
cultural rights, or rights to peace, development and the environment as "genuine" human rights.  
The unfortunate fact is that in the same way that many of the relativists are pursuing a political 
agenda designed to retain their hegemony over local political space utilizing the veneer of culture, 
the universalists are pursuing an equally politicized agenda of extending global hegemony under 
the rubric of human rights. And yet, the disparities in the human rights regime have not remained 
as atavistic relics from a contested and distant past. They are omnipresent even within 
contemporary struggles over the meaning and the content of human rights. Take the arena of 
women's human rights as one example. One would imagine that because of its more recent 
conceptual development, there would be considerably more comity of perspective between women 
from across cultures. Significant tension is nevertheless still manifest on a variety of issues from 
reproductive health rights,50 to the debate over the eradication of female genital mutilation 
(FGM)51 to the contention that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)52 did not adequately address the situation of rural women-the majority 
of whom are in countries of the "south."53  
Engaging in an extensive deconstruction of the normative elements enshrined within the existing 
human rights corpus is not the intention of the present paper. It is nevertheless critical to an 
understanding of the issues under examination that we remain cognizant of the limitations of the 
universalist discourse and its dominance in the human rights debate. This is because that 
dominance has particular implications for several aspects of contemporary human rights discourse 
and for their linkage to sustainable human development. For example, the under-emphasis-nay, 
denigration-of economic and social rights, and the debate about their alleged non-justiciability. 
Further to this is the discussion about the right to development and its stalled implementation; the 
issue of the debt burden (from a human rights perspective) and the whole question of non-state 
actors (particularly TNCs) and their relevance to the international respect for and enforcement of 
human rights. All these issues are implicated in the relativism/universalism discussion. 
Unfortunately they tend to be relegated to the background once the bogeyman of culture is erected 
to trump all alternative or contending argument. Nevertheless, as Anne Orford appropriately warns 
us:  
Whatever definition of rights and democracy we adopt, it remains necessary to question the 
assumption that the powerful international institutions operating in the economic and security areas 
are the bearers of even these limited liberal versions of democracy and rights in the post-Cold War 
era. To what extent is that idealization of the international realm based in turn upon selective 
erasures or motivated forgetting?54 
Regardless of the distinctions entailed by an approach that is rooted in the particularities of the 
African cultural experience, important consequences flow from the connection of the African normative framework as a regional human rights system to obligations concerning human rights 
under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration. According to Radhika 
Coomaraswamy-UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women-there is an element of rights 
discourse and practice that extends beyond geographical location or cultural specificity:  
Thus human rights discourse has resonance in the everyday experiences of individuals. Otherwise 
it would not have developed so dynamically and have become used by such different groups 
throughout the world. In other words-yes, perhaps human rights in its present day incarnation is a 
product of the Enlightenment, but its general thrust has resonance in diverse spiritual and cultural 
experiences. In terms of political values like the concept of democracy it is an important step 
forward for all human beings and all cultures.55 
Contemporary international standards of human rights and the international machinery erected for 
their protection are rooted in the obligations established under the UN Charter to promote universal 
respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion.56 The essential point is that despite the distinctive African 
"cultural fingerprint"57 implicit in several of its provisions, several aspects of the Charter provide 
evidence of a general acceptance of the normative standards (such as non-discrimination, equality 
of all persons, fundamental freedoms and liberties, for example) enshrined in the international 
instruments. Having retraced the conceptual issues relating to the African Charter, we can now turn 
to a more critical consideration of the specific provisions and the structure of the instrument.  
3.2 Breaking New Ground? The Structure and Content of the African Charter  
The African Charter can generally be divided into five distinct parts, viz., the provisions on civil and 
political rights; those on economic, social and cultural rights; the group or collective rights; the 
provisions which elaborate the duties in the Charter, and finally, the provisions governing the 
enforcement mechanisms in the instrument.58 The first category of rights is fairly straightforward, 
including non-discrimination (Article 2) and equality before the law (Article 3); the right to life 
(Article 4), and the inherence of human dignity (Article 5). Articles 6 to 13 specify the rights which 
are similarly covered either in the Universal Declaration or in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Striking omissions from the Charter are the prohibition against being 
subjected, "without free consent to medical or scientific experimentation" that is provided in Article 
7 of the ICCPR. The African Charter also lacks more elaborated guarantees against arbitrary 
detention. Similarly, although the right to a fair trial is covered by Article 7 of the Charter, it does not 
speak about trial in absentia, the issue of legal aid, or the right to an interpreter. Also omitted are 
compensation for the miscarriage of justice and protection against double jeopardy-all of which are 
covered by Article 14 of the ICCPR.59  
Perhaps the issue in the African Charter that has attracted most criticism is its extensive 
deployment of clawback clauses-phrases which could effectively remove (or at a minimum severely 
curtail) the right ostensibly guaranteed. In each of the provisions referred to above, clauses such 
as "... except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law..." (Article 6), "...subject to law 
and order..." (Article 8) and "... provided he abides by the law..." (Article 10) abound. Although the 
grant of the right is supposed to be paramount, the clawback clause may have the effect of taking 
away the right that is granted. This is especially a problem because in many African states you still 
have laws and regulations that are directly violative of human rights. For example, some states 
prohibit the formation of certain types of associations merely at the whim of the registering officer. 
In other cases, the law to which the right is subjected is so arbitrary that its effect is to completely 
negate the right ostensibly guaranteed. The clawback clauses coupled with the omission of certain rights does not therefore give the African Charter a very prominent position in the pantheon of 
instruments that seeks to extend rather than diminish the parameters of rights respect and 
enforcement.  
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the African Charter relates to its provisions on Peoples' 
rights and on the duties of individuals. Among the peoples' rights covered are those on the right to 
existence and to struggle against colonial domination (Article 20). Of course the interesting point 
about the question of peoples' rights is how the concept is of such fluidity that it could even 
undermine well established principles in the OAU Charter concerning the inviolability of states and 
the sacrosanct nature of their borders. The "oppressed peoples" in paragraph 2 of Article 20 who 
have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination do not necessarily have to be under 
the yoke of a colonial power. The collective rights to development (Article 22), to peace and 
security (Article 23) and Article 24 on the right to a "general satisfactory environment" are all rights 
which have greatly impacted on the jurisprudence of rights in the international arena.60 The African 
Charter was the first international instrument to lay down these kinds of rights in a legally binding 
fashion.61 Indeed, as we have already argued, these collective rights will become of fundamental 
importance in the coming millennium.  
Final mention must be made of the African Charter's elaborate codification of individual duties. 
Although both the Universal Declaration and the two covenants contain reference to the duties 
individuals owe to society, none of them are as extensive as the African Charter's elaboration.62 
The duties listed extend from the harmonious development of the family63 to the promotion and 
achievement of African unity.64 Most commentary about them has considered them to be too 
onerous, and focused on the possible use that can be made of them by states to effectively stump 
the individual rights guaranteed.65 While there has been little action undertaken to test this aspect 
of the Charter, it is quite clear that the concept of duties is not necessarily antithetical to the respect 
of human rights. What is clear nevertheless is the need to approach the matter in such a fashion 
that the overall observation and protection of individual rights is not undermined by an undue 
emphasis on duties. This point becomes even more clear if we consider that aspect of the Charter 
dealing with Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and explore their connection to the pursuit of 
sustainable human development.  
3.3 Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights: A New Approach to Sustainable Human 
Development?  
It is not erroneous to describe economic, social and cultural rights as the "ugly sister" to the more 
widely recognized civil and political rights.66 Not only is there a lacklustre approach to their 
effective realization, there are even lingering questions about their conception.67 Some have even 
gone so far as to argue that economic and social rights are not rights-they are merely 
unenforceable individual or group entitlements. Frequent objections focus on the issue of 
justiciability.68 The argument most often heard is that economic, social and cultural rights are 
simply not justiciable. In other words, they cannot be the subject of adjudication and enforcement 
through the mechanism of court litigation and judicial enforcement in the same way as civil and 
political rights. The argument continues to assert that economic, social and cultural rights are 
"aspirational" or "abstract"; they cannot be the subject of either affirmative state obligation or of 
immediate realization and enforcement. Both the Indian69 and South African courts have 
effectively disproved this thesis, aside from the fact that the 1993 Vienna Declaration explicitly 
reaffirmed the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the two categories of human 
rights.70 Consequently, the question for debate is not so much the conceptual but the practical: how to make economic and social rights resonate for the vast majority of the human population for 
whom these rights are critical?  
Several cases from both the aforementioned jurisdictions have affirmed that certain obligations with 
respect to the realization of the rights to education, health, and shelter, to mention only a few, 
cannot simply be evaded by the state, irrespective of the question of resources or financial ability. 
This is because in many instances what is at stake in the disputation over such rights may be 
issues such as discrimination (on gender or social status); prioritization (concerning budgetary 
allocations), or access. A state does not require to expend resources to address any of the above. 
Responding to the claim that the enforcement of social and economic rights must be dependent on 
the capacity of a state to afford the cost entailed (the so-called "afford ability" argument), the South 
African Constitutional Court has, for example stated:  
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in courts making orders that have 
direct implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a court enforces civil and political 
rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it makes will often 
have such implications. A court may require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state 
beneficiaries of such benefits. In our view, it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights 
within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it can result in a breach of 
the separation of powers.71 
Indeed, as Shadrack Gutto points out, the incorporation of justiciable rights in the Bill of Rights of a 
constitutional democracy that respects the Rule of Law and under conditions of social inequalities, 
"... means that such rights and processes of their justiciability is open to all; rich and poor, the 
advantaged and disadvantaged."72 The rich and advantaged are entitled to use the rights to 
defend their position while the poor and disadvantaged are entitled to do so in pursuit of their 
interests to either be given entry into the camp of the rich and advantaged to gain some 
improvement in their life conditions."73 Although Gutto goes on to argue that the social actions of 
all social classes tend to "balance out"-a point that I find difficult to accept-the more important issue 
here is that social and economic rights are not esoteric entitlements. Such rights can indeed be the 
subject of rights discourse and enforcement at the domestic level. The judgments of the South 
African court go a considerable distance in clarifying what has traditionally been extremely murky 
terrain.74  
The distinctive character of the African Charter has been extolled by numerous authors,75 
particularly with respect to the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights. 76 The Charter 
commences its approach to economic, social and cultural rights from the Preamble which 
stipulates that it was henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development. 
Furthermore, it goes on to assert that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, 
social and cultural rights in conception as well as in universality. The preamble concludes, with an 
affirmation that "... the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights."  
Some scholars have argued that all that the African Charter accomplished was to place economic, 
social and cultural rights and group (so-called "third generation") rights on the same footing as civil 
and political rights.77 It is my view that what the Charter did was to conceptually shift the emphasis 
from the traditional focus on civil and political rights. However, the extent to which it adopted a genuinely novel and revolutionary approach to the issue is debatable. Indeed, the conceptual shift 
was not met by a transition in the practical approach to and application of the basic elements of 
rights-discourse and implementation on economic and social rights whether at the continental or 
the national level of action in Africa. How is this so?  
A review of the historical process by which the African Charter came to approach economic and 
social rights is extremely important to understanding why there is a dichotomy between the theory 
enshrined in the instrument and the on the ground practice. In the first instance, the situation of civil 
and political rights on the continent was dismal, thereby attracting the opprobrium of the 
international community. African states and the leaders who assembled to discuss the Charter at 
the end of the 1970s were clearly on the defensive. Simultaneously, the debate over the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) had wound its way through the United Nations system but 
produced little by way of tangible results. The conceptual reversal implicit in the African Charter 
was a reflection of the prevailing belief that an alteration in the existing structures of the 
international political economy was a matter of priority. Among those structures was the absence of 
attention to issues such as basic education, health care and potable water-issues central to the 
prevailing developmental paradigm with its focus on increased aid. In this respect, by focusing on 
the Right to Development, the Charter was presaging the subsequent debate that was to lead to an 
international declaration on the same subject. However, the economic and social rights in question 
(to better health, improved education, and shelter inter alia) were seen not so much as rights of 
individual Africans, but rather as rights of the state. It was rights-theory in top-down and 
paternalistic fashion. The state was viewed as the "people."78 From such a perspective, obviously 
the "people" could not claim these rights against the state.  
At the same time, the drafters of the Charter were cautious, at a minimum, about the obligations 
entailed in a rights-approach towards matters that were traditionally confined to the sphere of 
political largesse. Thus, a systematic review of what is in the Charter will clearly demonstrate a 
lacklustre approach to the issue of economic and social rights. Coupled with the manner in which 
civil and political rights were approached and articulated it becomes clear that the drafters of the 
document were not genuinely rights-sensitive-whether towards civil and political rights or with 
respect to economic, social and cultural rights. In the Charter, the latter category commence with 
Article 14 guaranteeing the right to property. Article 15 is on the right to work (incorporating the 
right to equal pay) while Article 16 is on the right to mental and physical health, and Article 17 
covers the right to education. Finally, Article 18-which we shall consider more extensively when we 
turn to the issue of the Charter and women's human rights-concerns itself with the family and the 
obligations of the state towards what is described as the "natural unit and basis of society." The 
phraseology adopted for all these rights is very broad and nebulous-this in a document which 
proclaims such rights as a guarantee to the observance of civil and political rights.  
There are additional problems with the approach of the African Charter to this category of rights. 
The Charter does not make mention of several rights enshrined in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)79 such as the right to social security, an adequate 
standard of living,80 freedom from hunger81 or the right to strike.82 Furthermore, there is very little 
elaboration (as is done in the ICESCR) of the specificity of what the rights mentioned entail. This 
could be because the drafters were wary of duplication. After all, Article 60 allows the Commission 
to "draw inspiration" from other international instruments. But specifically elaborating these rights in 
an African instrument would have been in consonance with the conceptual spirit laid down in the Preamble to the Charter. Indeed the very scantiness and number of economic and social rights the 
Charter does mention belie the very strong statements of affirmation in the Preamble that refer to 
the necessity for such rights as a guarantee to the realization of civil and political rights. All in all, 
the African Charter is a serious let-down in both the formulation and in the reconceptualization of 
economic and social rights.83  
If the normative framework is lacking, the contemporary realization of economic and social rights 
on the African continent has been compounded by the policies of structural adjustment (SAPs) that 
have been in place since the early 1980s and by the phenomenon of globalization. The basic 
tenets of these policies are essentially antithetical to the effective realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights.84 This is primarily because the basic foundation of structural adjustment 
policies is a reduction of the role of the state in either guaranteeing, or in simply protecting the 
individual against the violation (or the progressive non-realization) of his or her economic and 
social rights. Policies such as privatization, trade liberalization and deregulation inordinately 
expose the individual to a variety of practices-particularly by TNCs-that have the effect of 
minimizing their options and parameters of choice. The "race-to-the-bottom" effect which has been 
set in place to attract more investment and on the bidding of international finance capital has 
entailed a much worsened situation of the protection of these rights. A distinct group that is 
considerably affected by both the realization of economic, social and cultural rights and by the 
impact of global policies of economic restructuring is African women.  
3.4 Women's Human Rights in the African Regional Framework  
Opinion on the impact and efficacy of the African Charter with respect to the situation of women on 
the continent is divided.85 On the one hand the Charter contains several provisions that relate to 
non-discrimination and equality of treatment. On the other, only one article out of more than sixty 
makes any reference to women. Even then, it is contained in an omnibus clause that covers both 
the family and upholds tradition thereby reproducing the essential tension that plagues the 
realization of the human rights of women. Article 18 of the Charter-the single provision that directly 
refers to women-has been the subject of considerable debate by commentators on the situation of 
women on the African continent.86 It is thus trite to point out that the Charter is a document that 
makes minimal reference to the human rights of women, although, as one scholar has observed, it 
did, "... at some level, contemplate the situation of women."87 Lisa Kois argues further that there is 
some proof that the framers of the document were not entirely incognisant of the situation of 
women:  
The proof of such consideration is found through the implicit and explicit identification of 
discrimination against women as an obstacle impeding the full enjoyment of the human rights of 
women. Implicitly, the drafters identified the existence of sex-based discrimination found in both the 
preamble to the Charter and in Article 2. Additionally, Article 18, which specifically addresses the 
family, contains a provision directing states to eliminate all existing forms of discrimination against 
women and to protect the rights of women.88 
Many commentators have argued that both the type of family and the kind of tradition envisaged in 
the African Charter can be deployed to inhibit the realm and enjoyment of women's human rights. 
Outside the Charter, the Guidelines on State Reportage that are supposed to provide states with 
the methodology for their reportage to the Commission follow the principles adopted in Article 18 of 
CEDAW. However, the emphasis continues to be on marriage, motherhood and child-care, while 
issues such as employment, property rights and gender violence are given only scant attention. It is not that the former issues are unimportant. However, a focus that is confined only to those 
spheres of concern is clearly a limited one.89  
The regional and international framework guaranteeing the rights of women notwithstanding, at the 
domestic level in numerous countries around the continent, considerable problems subsist for 
African women at the national and community levels. Indeed, it is at this level that the full force of 
discriminatory and exclusionary practices continues to be felt. Different countries have approached 
the issue of gender-based discrimination in a variety of ways. Mumbi Mathangani states that in 
practice Courts in Kenya "... have completely disregarded the country's commitments to CEDAW 
and to other international standards."90 However, in the famous Botswana case of Attorney 
General v. Unity Dow,91 the Court adopted and used values enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the 
Constitution of Botswana and the African Charter in order to override traditional customs relating to 
the unequal treatment of women regarding their citizenship rights. Unity Dow's case was thus 
important for the conceptual and normative boost it gave to the domestic application of the African 
Charter. Although Botswana is a state party to the instrument (as is the case with every other 
African country) it had not adopted enabling legislation incorporating the provisions of the 
instrument into the domestic legal regime. Regardless of this fact, the court found no problem in 
holding that the provisions of the instrument bound Botswana.  
But victories such as those represented by the Unity Dow case are sometimes counter-acted and 
even undermined by judicial pronouncements, government policies and resilient cultural practices 
that have the effect of turning the clock back. To its credit, the government of Botswana eventually 
amended its citizenship law to remove the discriminatory provisions. However, executive and 
judicial action in response to discrimination may do the complete reverse. For example, Human 
Rights activists across the continent were shocked by the recent ruling by the Zimbabwean 
Supreme Court in the case of Venia Magaya v. Nakayi Shonhiwa Magaya.92 The main issue in 
contention was whether a woman could inherit her father's estate if he died without leaving will. In 
the first instance, the Court made no reference whatsoever to CEDAW or to other relevant 
international instruments, arguing that in any event domestic provisions which discriminate against 
the human rights of women are "exceptions" that would effectively override the international 
instruments.93  
The learned judge went on to observe that, "At the head of the (African) family there was a 
patriarch, or a senior man, who exercised control over the property and lives of women and juniors. 
It is from this that the status of women is derived. The woman's status is therefore basically the 
same as that of any junior male in the family."94 In other words, women-irrespective of their age-
were deemed the equivalent of minors. The use made by the Court of the African Charter actually 
run in the opposite direction from that espoused by the Bench in Unity Dow's case. Citing with 
approval a book by a Prof. Bennet entitled Human Rights and African Customary Law under the 
South African Constitution, the learned judge extracted the following quotation:  
The obligation to care for family members, which lies at the heart of the African social system, is a 
vital and fundamental value, which Africa's Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is careful to 
stress. Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Charter urges parties to pay heed to 'the virtues of (the 
African) historical tradition and the values of African civilisation,' and Ch.2 provides an inventory of 
the duties that individuals owe their families and society. Article 29(1), in particular, states that each person is obliged to preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the 
cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of 
need.95 
The Magaya decision is important to the issue of the realization of the human rights of women in 
Africa for several reasons. In the first instance, it brings out the resilience of patriarchal forms of 
control and discrimination and the considerable obstacles that stand in the way of the struggle to 
achieve gender parity and greater respect for women's human rights on the African continent. 
Many times, the reasons given for the retention of discriminatory practices relate to the ostensible 
need to retain social harmony and cohesion. Thus, Justice Muchechetere could justify his judgment 
in terms of the need to approach such matters with caution:  
Whilst I am in total agreement with the submission that there is a need to advance gender equality 
in all spheres of society, I am of the view that great care must be taken when African customary 
law is under consideration. In the first instance, it must be recognised that customary law has long 
directed the way African people conducted their lives and the majority of Africans in Zimbabwe still 
live in rural areas and still conduct their lives in terms of customary law. In the circumstances, it will 
not readily be abandoned, especially by those such as senior males who stand to lose their 
positions of privilege.... In view of the above, I consider it prudent to pursue a pragmatic and 
gradual change which would win long term acceptance rather than legal revolution initiated by the 
courts.96 
The Magaya decision is of critical importance to the discussion of the contemporary human rights 
situation on the African continent for several other reasons, aside from the points we have already 
noted. Upholding discrimination against women simply on account of their sex has several 
implications for their enjoyment of human rights-civil and political and economic, social and cultural. 
Among them are of course issues relating to participation in both economic and political life.97 But 
even more importantly is the fact that to deem a woman a minor means that actions such as 
"chastisement" (better known as domestic violence) would also be deemed acceptable means of 
subjecting women to "discipline."  
In this way, customary law is elevated to a status that negates not only the constitutional provisions 
that are enshrined within the bill of rights and other provisions of the basic legal regime of a 
country, but it also negates the whole impact of international provisions. At this point the tensions 
we earlier referred to between an international regime that seeks to guarantee rights and a 
domestic framework in which such rights are taken away come to the fore. It then becomes 
necessary to engage the specific practice being endorsed in what Abdullahi An-Naim and others 
have described as a cross-cultural discourse. Secondly, this means that it is essential to 
interrogate the interests that underpin the continued support for the cultural practice in question; 
who is supporting the practice? Why are they doing so? What are its consequences for the 
particular individual and for the class or group of persons that the practice is being directed 
against? How can we most effectively convey the point that gender discrimination is not simply a 
matter of disparate treatment, but that it also affects the realization of sustainable human 
development? All these questions demonstrate that the African Charter provides an incomplete 
answer. Not only is there a need to reinforce Article 18 with a more elaborate rendering of the 
respect for women's human rights-a process being attempted through the drafting of an optional 
protocol to the Charter98-but critical attention must also be paid to the domestic context of each 
African country.  3.5 The Phenomenon of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)  
The human rights regime in Africa is also concerned with the situation of people who have been 
forcibly displaced from their homes and have either fled across the border (as refugees) or are 
internally displaced. Following a growing prominence of refugee flows after the attainment of 
independence for most African countries in the 1960s, the OAU promulgated the Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa.99 Considered among the most 
liberal regimes governing refugees in the world, the Convention made several significant 
contributions to the corpus of international refugee law. Among them were its approach to burden 
sharing, non-rejection at the border, the principle of non-refoulement, voluntary repatriation and 
temporary asylum.100 In particular, the definition of the term "refugee" employed in the Convention 
is extremely wide in that it recognizes the objective conditions that may cause flight rather than the 
subjective criteria imposed by the international legal regime epitomized by the 1951 Geneva 
Convention.101 As the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights has pointed out, the adoption of the 
Convention was prompted "... more by a concern with large flows of refugees whose exodus was 
related to Africa's colonial occupation and wars of national liberation than by concern about 
persecution on an individual basis."102  
Despite possession of a liberal refugee regime, at the end of the day, the continental spirit 
embodied in the OAU Convention is tempered by existing realities on the ground. In the first 
instance, there is no continental-wide agency akin to the African Commission exclusively devoted 
to the situation of refugees. Although forced displacement is a human rights matter, the 
Commission has its hands full as it is dealing with the myriad other human rights problems it must 
address. The OAU Bureau for Refugees that is stationed at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa 
is almost wholly impotent, and has been further subordinated by the establishment of a conflict 
management and resolution mechanism within the body. Although refugees are indeed a product 
of conflict, their problems cannot be simply lumped together in omnibus fashion under the overall 
focus of the question of conflict.103 The consequence of the lack of an effective institution at the 
continental level is twofold; the refugee crisis is dominated by the UNHCR-the global agency 
concerned with refugees-which sometimes approaches the question of displacement in hot-house 
fashion, and by individual states. Needless to say, both have their problems. At individual country 
levels the spirit of the OAU Convention is even less apparent. According to the Lawyers 
Committee:  
Individual status determination procedures are often labyrinthine and incomprehensible to 
applicants. Frequently, applicants have no access to independent advice or representation, and no 
possibility of appealing an unfavorable decision. Collective determination may also carry with it 
serious restrictions on a refugee's rights. For example, refugees may only be recognized as such 
while they remain in designated rural settlements or regions. Thus, should they attempt to exercise 
their right to freedom of movement, they may lost their refugee status. They may even risk arrest 
and detention at the hands of security personnel.104 
For a refugee that does not have any status whatsoever, the implications are even more dire, in 
both legal and practical terms. The grant of status in many countries is often a prerequisite to a 
host of human rights-extending from freedom of movement to the possibility of accessing gainful 
employment. Where a refugee is not recognized by the law they stand wedged between the rock of 
discrimination in the country in which they have sought solace and the hard place of possible 
refoulement to the place from which they escaped in the first instance. Furthermore, in many 
African countries there is a growing spate of xenophobia, in part provoked by conditions of worsening hardship, such that the old African maxim about African's being their brother's (or 
sister's) keepers does not necessarily always apply. A country like Tanzania that had traditionally 
opened its arms to refugees only recently adopted an extremely restrictive approach to refugee 
settlement and integration in the wake of the Rwandese crisis.  
Finally, the OAU Convention is completely silent on the issue of refugee women, and also on the 
question of internal displacement (of both sexes)-an issue that has come to the fore as a major 
humanitarian and human rights crisis not only on the African continent.105 Internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) do not have an international regime to cover their specific situation, which is 
compounded by the fact that although they face the same conditions as refugees, there is neither a 
normative nor an institutional mechanism to cater to their situation. And yet, in the words of Cohen 
and Deng, their condition is appalling:  
Of the world's populations at risk, internally displaced people tend to be among the most 
desperate. They may be forcibly resettled on political or ethnic grounds or find themselves trapped 
in the midst of conflicts and the direct path of armed attack and physical violence. On the run and 
without document, they are easy targets for roundups. Arbitrary detention, forced conscription, and 
sexual assaults. Uprooted from their homes and deprived of their resource base, many suffer from 
profound physical and psychological trauma. They are more often deprived of shelter, food and 
health services than other members of the population.106 
If the most important mechanism for refugees is recognition of their status and the existence of a 
regime of legal protection to cover undue assault and discrimination against them, it is easy to 
appreciate why the lack of a similar framework for IDPs is particularly disconcerting. Moreover, the 
elaboration of an international legal regime is unlikely to be developed beyond the Guiding 
Principles on Forced Displacement produced by the UN Secretary General's Representative on 
Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng.107 The connection to the issue of human rights is 
manifest in the fact that the major reason for forced displacement in Africa is according to Susanne 
Schmeidl, "... brutally repressive regimes, ethnic conflict, and external destabilization 
campaigns."108 The magnitude of the problem is better appreciated if we consider the fact that the 
population of IDPs in Africa outnumbers that of refugees. The implications for sustainable human 
development are obvious. In the absence at a minimum of an effective regime to address the issue 
in a rights-sensitive fashion, the phenomenon of internal forced displacement will act as a 
significant impediment to the realization of sustainable human development in Africa. Of course, 
this issue is directly linked to the question of the institutional mechanisms that exist on the African 
continent.  
IV. AFRICA'S INSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  
4.1 The Role and Place of the African Commission and a Note on the New Court  
The African Charter has been ratified by every single African state with the exception of two-
perhaps the most significant rate of ratification of any international instrument. If ratification per se 
were to be the yardstick by which adherence and implementation of the principles within the 
instrument were to be judged, then the African human rights situation would be considerably less 
troubled than it is. Unfortunately, even the most positive reviews of the performance of the major 
mechanism of implementation of the Charter-the African Commission on Human & Peoples' 
Rights-generally agree that the institution has performed at less than par.109 Several reasons can be advanced in explanation for this situation, extending from the conceptual and infrastructural to 
the political. A disillusioned Professor Oji Umozurike-former member of the Commission-was 
reported to have made several succinct observations on the problems of the African Commission:  
Most cases of human rights violations filed by individuals and organizations take an average of two 
years to process. State parties rarely provide prompt answers or any answers at all until threatened 
with a finding in default. Complainants' costs are prohibitive and, until very recently, little or no 
publicity could be given to the proceedings and issues. Rules ... ensure that public embarrassment 
and shame cannot act to remedy current situations or prevent new occurrences.110 
Additional problems that plague the Commission relate to the facilitative or infrastructural 
bottlenecks that it faces as an institution. The question of funding has long been a major problem 
for the Commission, with member states being extremely lacklustre in meeting their dues, and 
thereby preventing the body from operating effectively. As a consequence, the Commission has 
been forced to rely on funding sources that mainly emanate from outside the continent-a situation 
which, as Shadrack Gutto points out-is not a sustainable one in the long run.111 Indeed calls have 
been made for the establishment of an African Human Rights Fund to facilitate the operations of 
the Commission.112  
Joshua Mzizi has observed that the Charter itself is an obstacle to the more effective realization of 
human rights on the continent:  
The Charter provides for a broad spectrum of rights and responsibilities, but it is woefully deficient 
in the enforcement machinery. The Commission has the mandate to compile reports on violations 
for the attention of Heads of State and Governments. The internationally respected norm of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state makes timely intervention impossible even 
when urgent measures have to be taken in order to protect human life.113 
Mzizi touches upon the most fundamental of the problems faced by the African Commission, the 
issue of political will-an issue that is both internal and external to the institution. Internally, there are 
questions such as the independence and expertise of the Commissioners, as well as the 
genuineness of their commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights. There is also a 
reluctance to make decisions that would displease the appointing authority-the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. Thus far, more than ten years after it commenced operations the 
Commission has not even slightly threatened the 'business-as-usual' modus operandi that prevails 
among African states and within the OAU. Its operations do not even marginally affect the status 
quo. To compound it all, the mechanism of state reportage which is supposed to be the bedrock of 
the system has proven a dismal failure. New initiatives such as the appointment of a Special 
Rapporteur on Summary and Extra-Judicial Executions and another on Prisons are yet to make 
any significant inroads on the African human rights scene. Externally, the over-bearing presence of 
African states will always be a factor to countenance. Odinkalu and Christensen put their finger on 
the issue when they state: "Whether the Commission will be perceived as an effective institution for 
the protection of human rights in Africa will largely depend on how far and how much the state 
parties to the African Charter take seriously, and respect, the Commission's views and 
recommendations."114 So far, they have not.  
Against such a background, the establishment of a Court on Human Rights for Africa is a 
development that can only be greeted with caution.115 It is likely that the Court will be plagued by the very same problems that have hampered the work of the Commission. Even if by some 
miraculous occurrence the infrastructural issues were to be tackled, the paramount issue of 
political will remains an outstanding one. If the Court is to be relevant to the human rights scene on 
the continent, then it must be able to make decisions that in the end assist individual African men 
and women. Otherwise, it will have to adopt a "softly-softly" approach mirroring that of the African 
Commission. And if after more than a decade of existence the Commission has hardly made a dent 
in the human rights scene, the Court would be doomed to a similar fate. But there are additional 
institutional mechanisms designed to address aspects of the human rights question in Africa, 
especially with regard to the issue of conflict.  
4.2 The OAU Mechanism on Conflict Resolution and the Bureau for Refugees  
Given that the issue of armed conflict and its impact on human rights has surfaced to the fore so 
dramatically in the contemporary African context, it is not surprising that the OAU established the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in June, 1993.116 Designed 
basically to foster the speedy and peaceful resolution of conflicts on the continent, the Mechanism 
is the newest institution that attempts to ensure that the situation of human rights violations does 
not escalate out of hand.117 Some scholars contend that the Mechanism has met with some 
success, for example, in the brokering of an agreement in Congo Brazzaville between rival political 
groups.118 However, since its establishment, conflicts have broken out in Rwanda (with the 
genocide that followed), Burundi, Sierra Leone and a host of other countries around the continent. 
In both the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Eritrean/Ethiopian war-Africa's most recent 
conflagrations-the Mechanism has been largely absent or simply silent. Indeed, in the admission of 
the officer in charge of the Mechanism, "... much of the OAU's time is allocated to dealing with the 
effects of conflicts, rather than preventing situations of tension from growing into full-blown 
confrontation."119  
On its part, the OAU Bureau for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs has 
always had a minimalist role with respect to the human rights or other issues relating to forced 
displacement on the continent.120 Even before its mandate was extended to include the issue of 
forced displacement, it was fairly clear that it had not executed its mandate very well on the sole 
issue of refugees. Like the African Commission, it is hamstrung by infrastructural and financial 
inabilities. Cohen and Deng indeed understate the problem: "In the case of the internally displaced, 
it has no specific programs, and in the area of protection, it does little, whether for refugees or 
internally displaced persons."121 Cohen and Deng also point to the possibility of developing a joint 
collaborative role between the Bureau, the Mechanism and the African Commission-a collaboration 
they believe would greatly enhance the overall protection of the human rights of all the concerned 
parties on the continent. But it is doubtful whether collectively they would be able to overcome their 
individual limitations.  
Is there a possible role for sub-regional bodies in addressing the human rights situation on the 
continent? Organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa, are at least geographically well situated to address some of 
the major issues on the human rights scene in their individual regions. Unfortunately, in many 
respects these institutions are simply microcosms of the OAU with regard to both financial capacity 
as well as in relation to the critical factor of political will. None of the organizations have explicitly 
incorporated matters relating to human rights within the operational frameworks of their mandates. Several have broad statements of commitment to, for example, "... encourage the observance of 
human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the Organization of African Unity 
and the United Nations."122 This is clearly insufficient and requires to be matched by much more 
concrete manifestations of action on the issue. But regional institutions can only build on the 
strengths of their individual membership. Individual countries therefore constitute the building 
blocks on which regional organizations must rely in order to make a serious impact in the human 
rights and human development arena.  
4.3 Enforcement at the National Level and the role of Civil Society  
Promoting a culture of human rights discourse and practice at the national level is perhaps the real 
struggle, as opposed to the regional or international one. While there are certainly significant 
benefits that flow from a regional approach to human rights protection and enforcement, ultimately, 
human rights must be enforced at the national level. This can only take place through a twofold 
process-in the first instance by encouraging individual governments to establish the necessary 
frameworks and institutional mechanisms such as human rights commissions or ombudspersons 
with the specific function of promoting and protecting human rights. A precusor to doing so must be 
a process of engagement with national constitutional frameworks in order to review them to ensure 
that they are broadly reflective of the necessary human rights content. Such content must not 
simply confine itself to a focus on civil and political rights, but be extended to include economic, 
social and cultural rights, as well as the so-called Third Generation rights. In the context of 
constitutionalism, Judiciaries have a critical role to play as both mediators of tensions and conflicts 
that may emerge between the Executive arm of government and the population at large. They must 
also effectively and progressively translate international and regional human rights instruments into 
the domestic context, even where the constitutional regime may not be reflective of a progressive 
human rights approach.  
The role of civil society organizations in pursuing the greater promotion of human rights has 
traditionally been an important one in Africa, at both the individual country level, and even with 
respect to the mechanisms established at the continental one.123 Indeed, since the late 1980s 
there has been a literal explosion of associational activity in the vast majority of countries around 
the continent.124 For civil society to effectively execute its role an enabling environment must be 
established in which associations dedicated to the promotion of human rights and civil liberties are 
actually able to operate. Thus, archaic laws that inhibit the registration and operation of civic 
associations need to be amended. At the same time, civil society cannot confine itself to the pursuit 
of civil and political rights alone as has been the case in almost all African countries to date. There 
is a need to marry the actions of organizations that are involved in traditional development work to 
those who pursue action within a rights framework. There is also a need for such organizations to 
themselves directly engage economic and social issues from a rights-grounded perspective. Only 
then will some progress be registered in the struggle to marry the struggle for human rights to the 
quest for sustainable human development.  
V. THE WAY AHEAD: MEETING THE CHALLENGES, EXPLOITING THE OPPORTUNITIES  
As this account demonstrates, Africa faces considerable obstacles in meeting the challenges 
entailed by the coming of a new century, and by the social, political and economic conditions that 
prevail on the continent. But there are also numerous opportunities which can be ably exploited in order to ensure that human rights serves the objective of attaining sustainable human 
development. The issue of education or sensitization in human rights is a fundamental one. As 
Carlson Anyangwe points out however, most African states have been lacklustre in pursuing an 
obligation clearly imposed by the African Charter:  
... the reality is that in many an African State overall human rights law per se and rights ideology 
generally are little promoted and continue to have little or no place in teaching (and practice) 
whether in primary, secondary, or tertiary levels of education. For one thing, in many States the 
discipline of human right is not yet a recognised subject for generalized education. There are few 
teaching aids. There is little common methodology. Most of those actively involved in human rights 
advocacy are not teachers. Information on the Charter, key to teaching about the rights and duties 
therein contained, is often inaccessible to the general public and generally there is a serious lack of 
knowledge of the content of that instrument. What is more, African Governments still remain deeply 
suspicious of the teaching and popularisation of human rights.125 
But such education must be coupled with active promotion and protection. In this respect the 
challenge is to marry the theoretical analyses that abound to strategies that lead to the 
development a culture of human rights respect.  
Considerable challenges are also presented by the existence of significant Non-state actors 
(NSAs) such as the family, arms-dealers, guerrilla groups and transnational corporations who 
impact on the human rights situation in varying ways. Similarly a multitude of strategies must be 
employed to address them. Furthermore, we must expand the network of agencies and persons 
doing human rights. This is one area which cannot remain the exclusive domain of professionals or 
experts if it is to be of any utility. For example, the process of demonstrating that economic, social 
and cultural rights are indeed rights and can be made justiciable must be made a popular project. 
As Shadrack Gutto points out in reference to the South African case to confine the notion of 
justiciability to the courts "would greatly limit the realization of human rights, or undermine the 
construction of a culture of human rights."126 This point obviously has continental applicability.  
There are still considerable normative challenges that need to be addressed, both with respect to 
the existing frameworks (in the African Charter and the OAU Convention, for example), as well as 
where there are lacunae, as in the case of IDPs.  
The place of the state in Africa-irrespective of the condition in which it is in-is critical to ensuring 
that the human rights message (especially concerning economic, social and cultural rights) is not 
only transmitted, but also becomes popularized. A weak state cannot do much against powerful 
multinationals; an indifferent state ultimately stands to lose from a labour force that exploits child 
labour and is paid below the minimum wage; a state does not have to seek recourse in military 
methods to resolve a political conflict. Finally, in none of these instances does the state need to 
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